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Behavior Strategy


A behavior strategy in an extensive-form game assigns a probability distribution over the available actions at each of a player's information sets. The random choices at different information sets are independent. A mixed strategy makes a single random choice among complete pure strategies, so it can correlate the actions specified at different information sets.

For a finite extensive-form game with perfect recall, the two types of randomization generate the same possible distributions of terminal histories against any fixed strategies of the other players (Kuhn 1953). An equivalent mixed strategy samples the action for each information set independently before play and uses the resulting plan as the pure strategy.


See also

Extensive-Form Game, Mixed Strategy, Perfect Recall

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References

Kuhn, H. W. "Extensive Games and the Problem of Information." In Contributions to the Theory of Games, Vol. II. (Ed. H. W. Kuhn and A. W. Tucker). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 193-216, 1953. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400881970-012.Osborne, M. J. and Rubinstein, A. A Course in Game Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994.

Cite this as:

Weisstein, Eric W. "Behavior Strategy." From MathWorld--A Wolfram Resource. https://mathworld.wolfram.com/BehaviorStrategy.html

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