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Perfect Recall


A player in an extensive-form game has perfect recall if any two nodes in the same information set have the same ordered record of that player's previous information sets and actions. The game has perfect recall if every player does. A player can have perfect recall even while lacking perfect information about other players' moves (Kuhn 1953).

To see why recall matters, consider a player who chooses A or B twice and forgets the first choice before making the second. A mixed strategy that chooses the plan AA or BB with equal probability makes the two choices agree. A behavior strategy that makes each choice equally likely to be A must randomize independently at the two information sets and therefore assigns probability 1/4 to each of the four histories. It cannot reproduce the correlated plan.


See also

Behavior Strategy, Extensive-Form Game, Perfect Information

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References

Kuhn, H. W. "Extensive Games and the Problem of Information." In Contributions to the Theory of Games, Vol. II. (Ed. H. W. Kuhn and A. W. Tucker). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 193-216, 1953. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400881970-012.Osborne, M. J. and Rubinstein, A. A Course in Game Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994.

Cite this as:

Weisstein, Eric W. "Perfect Recall." From MathWorld--A Wolfram Resource. https://mathworld.wolfram.com/PerfectRecall.html

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