TOPICS
Search

Strategic Dominance


In a normal-form game, one strategy strictly dominates another for the same player if it yields a higher payoff against every profile of the opponents' strategies. It weakly dominates the other if it yields at least as high a payoff against every profile and a higher payoff against at least one. A mixed strategy can strictly dominate a pure strategy even when no other pure strategy does.

A strictly dominated pure strategy is never a best response and so has probability zero in any Nash equilibrium. In the prisoner's dilemma, defection strictly dominates cooperation for each player. Mutual defection is consequently the unique Nash equilibrium.


See also

Best Response, Nash Equilibrium, Prisoner's Dilemma

Explore with Wolfram|Alpha

References

Osborne, M. J. and Rubinstein, A. A Course in Game Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994.

Cite this as:

Weisstein, Eric W. "Strategic Dominance." From MathWorld--A Wolfram Resource. https://mathworld.wolfram.com/StrategicDominance.html

Subject classifications