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Game Core


The core of a transferable-utility cooperative game consists of allocations of the grand coalition's worth that no coalition can block. For a player set N and a coalition worth function v, an allocation x=(x_i)_(i in N) belongs to the core if

 sum_(i in N)x_i=v(N).

It must also satisfy sum_(i in S)x_i>=v(S) for every coalition S subset= N. A coalition whose worth exceeds its assigned total could redistribute its worth to give each member strictly more.

For example, in the three-player game in which a coalition has worth 1 if it contains at least two players and 0 otherwise, the three two-player inequalities imply 2(x_1+x_2+x_3)>=3. Efficiency requires x_1+x_2+x_3=1, so the core is empty.


See also

Cooperative Game, Shapley Value

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References

Osborne, M. J. and Rubinstein, A. A Course in Game Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994.

Cite this as:

Weisstein, Eric W. "Game Core." From MathWorld--A Wolfram Resource. https://mathworld.wolfram.com/GameCore.html

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