Vickrey Auction

An auction in which the highest bidder wins but pays only the second-highest bid. This variation over the normal bidding procedure is supposed to encourage bidders to bid the largest amount they are willing to pay.

See also


Explore with Wolfram|Alpha


Vickrey, W. "Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders." J. Finance 16, 8-27, 1961. Reprinted in The Economics of Information, Vol. 1 (Ed. D. K. Levine and S. A. Lippman). Aldershot, Hants, England: Elgar, pp. 8-44, 1995.

Referenced on Wolfram|Alpha

Vickrey Auction

Cite this as:

Weisstein, Eric W. "Vickrey Auction." From MathWorld--A Wolfram Web Resource.

Subject classifications