An auction in which the highest bidder wins but pays only the second-highest bid. This variation over the normal bidding procedure is supposed to encourage bidders to bid the largest amount they are willing to pay.

# Vickrey Auction

## See also

Auction## Explore with Wolfram|Alpha

## References

Vickrey, W. "Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders."*J. Finance*

**16**, 8-27, 1961. Reprinted in

*The Economics of Information, Vol. 1*(Ed. D. K. Levine and S. A. Lippman). Aldershot, Hants, England: Elgar, pp. 8-44, 1995.

## Referenced on Wolfram|Alpha

Vickrey Auction## Cite this as:

Weisstein, Eric W. "Vickrey Auction."
From *MathWorld*--A Wolfram Web Resource. https://mathworld.wolfram.com/VickreyAuction.html