The name folk theorem refers to a family of results in game theory asserting that many outcomes can be sustained as equilibria when a game is repeated indefinitely. In a standard discounted repeated game, every feasible payoff vector that gives each player more than the player's minmax payoff can, under suitable hypotheses, be supported by an equilibrium that remains a Nash equilibrium after every possible history when the players are sufficiently patient. The result is called a "folk theorem" because versions of it circulated informally before definitive proofs appeared.
Folk Theorem
See also
Game Theory, Nash Equilibrium, Repeated GameExplore with Wolfram|Alpha
References
Fudenberg, D. and Maskin, E. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information." Econometrica 54, 533-554, 1986. https://doi.org/10.2307/1911307.Cite this as:
Weisstein, Eric W. "Folk Theorem." From MathWorld--A Wolfram Resource. https://mathworld.wolfram.com/FolkTheorem.html