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Condorcet Winner


A Condorcet winner is an alternative that defeats every other alternative in a pairwise majority comparison. Such a winner need not exist, as cyclic preferences can produce voting paradoxes.

Let C(m,n) be the probability of a Condorcet winner when n voters independently choose uniformly random strict rankings of m alternatives. Kim and Shin (2026) proved Kelly's two monotonicity conjectures for odd electorates: C(m,n)>C(m,n+2) for m>=3 and odd n>=1, and C(m,n)>C(m+1,n) for m>=2 and odd n>=3. The restrictions exclude C(2,n)=1 for odd n and C(m,1)=1. The results do not settle the corresponding questions for even electorates.


See also

Condorcet Candidate, Voting Paradoxes

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References

Kim, S. and Shin, H. "Kelly's Conjectures on Condorcet Winner Probabilities for Odd Electorates." 21 Oct 2026. https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.29904.

Cite this as:

Weisstein, Eric W. "Condorcet Winner." From MathWorld--A Wolfram Resource. https://mathworld.wolfram.com/CondorcetWinner.html

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