Tit-for-tat is a strategy for the iterated prisoner's dilemma in which a prisoner cooperates on the first move, and thereafter
copies the previous move of the other prisoner. It was submitted by A. Rapoport
to Axelrod's computer tournaments, where it performed notably well despite its simplicity
(Axelrod 1980ab, Axelrod and Hamilton 1981).
Tit-for-tat is neither uniformly optimal nor uniquely successful among simple strategies. For example, Nowak and Sigmund (1993) described a win-stay, lose-shift strategy that can outperform tit-for-tat.
Wolfram (2026) found that, among deterministic 2-state-machine strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemma, tit-for-tat
ranks below the top performer for long-run average payoff.